Circles' remote-instance signature verification fetches the attacker-supplied keyId URL before trust in the remote instance is established, and explicitly allows local/private addresses for this request, bypassing Nextcloud's core SSRF protections. The public, unauthenticated endpoints POST /apps/circles/event/ and POST /apps/circles/incoming/ reach this code path, allowing any unauthenticated user to force the server to issue a GET request to an internal address. The response body of the internal request is never returned to the requester, so this is blind SSRF: an attacker can determine whether an internal service is reachable, but cannot read its response contents through this endpoint alone.
Data: CVE.org, NVD, CISA KEV, FIRST EPSS, Ubuntu. Published as the sources state it, in English.
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