3.2Niedrig
TeleMessage service
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on MD5 for password hashing, which opens up various attack possibilities (including rainbow tables) with low computational effort.
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2.8Niedrig
TeleMessage service
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 stores certain cleartext information in memory, even though memory content may be accessible to an adversary through various avenues.
4.0Mittel
TeleMessage service
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 implements authentication through a long-lived credential (e.g., not a token with a short expiration time) that can be reused at a later date if discovered by an adversary.
4.0Mittel
CVE-2025-48928
KEV
TeleMessage TM SGNL Exposure of Core Dump File to an Unauthorized Control Sphere Vulnerability
TeleMessage service
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 is based on a JSP application in which the heap content is roughly equivalent to a "core dump" in which a password previously sent over HTTP would be included in this dump, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.
5.3Mittel
CVE-2025-48927
KEV
TeleMessage TM SGNL Initialization of a Resource with an Insecure Default Vulnerability
TeleMessage service
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 configures Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI, as exploited in the wild in May 2025.
12%EPSS
4.3Mittel
TeleMessage service
The admin panel in the TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 allows attackers to discover usernames, e-mail addresses, passwords, and telephone numbers.
4.3Mittel
TeleMessage service
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on the client side (e.g., the TM SGNL app) to do MD5 hashing, and then accepts the hash as the authentication credential.
4.8Mittel
TeleMessage archiving backend
The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 accepts API calls (to request an authentication token) from the TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app with the credentials of logfile for the user and enRR8UVVywXYbFkqU#QDPRkO for the password.